Statute of Limitation--Statutory Cause of Action--Pleading (Schmidt v. Merchants Dispatch Transportation Co., 270 N.Y. 287 (1936)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 11 
Number 2 Volume 11, April 1937, Number 2 Article 26 
May 2014 
Statute of Limitation--Statutory Cause of Action--Pleading 
(Schmidt v. Merchants Dispatch Transportation Co., 270 N.Y. 287 
(1936)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1937) "Statute of Limitation--Statutory Cause of Action--Pleading (Schmidt v. 
Merchants Dispatch Transportation Co., 270 N.Y. 287 (1936))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 11 : No. 2 , 
Article 26. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss2/26 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
STATUTE OF LIMITATION-STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION-
PLEADING.-Plaintiff while employed in defendant's factory inhaled
deleterious dust released through defendant's failure to provide the
necessary protective apparatus as required by the Labor Law.1 The
dust lodging in plaintiff's lungs, caused plaintiff to contract silicosis
more than three years after leaving defendant's employ. Plaintiff then
instituted this action alleging negligence, nuisance, breach of contract,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and damages for failure to provide the
safeguards required by statute.2 Defendant moved to have all the al-
leged causes of action other than negligence stricken from the com-
plaint because they consisted of claimed facts and circumstances which
were nothing more than specifications of negligence, against which ac-
tion defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations.3 From judgment
granting and affirming defendant's motion, plaintiff appealed. Held,
judgment modified to permit the last alleged cause of action and as
modified affirmed. The other alleged causes of action were in effect
negligence actions and as such are governed by the three-year Statute
of Limitation, and hence were properly dismissed.4 However, a cause
of action created by statute, except an action upon a statute for a pen-
alty or forfeiture where the action is given to a person aggrieved or to
that person and the state, has a six-year limitation.5 Schmidt v.
Merchants Dispatch Transportation Co., 270 N. Y. 287, 200 N. E.
824 (1936).
The defendant has committed a single wrongful act which has
proximately caused a single injury to the plaintiff. This wrongful
act is essentially negligence. Therefore any action based upon it is an
action in negligence whether pleaded in the form of nuisance, breach
of contract, or fraudulent misrepresentation. 6 A three-year limitation
runs against this action from the time it accrues. An action accrues
at the time the wrongful act proximately caused damage to the plain-
tiff.7 The period of limitation, therefore, ran from the time the dust
was inhaled and not from the time the disease developed.8
'N. Y. LABOR LAW § 229, (2), (3).
"Ibid.
IN. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 49.
' N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 49; Pine v. Waterbury Clock Co., 245 App. Div.
605, 283 N. Y. Supp. 763 (1st Dept. 1935) ; Speziale v. National Brass Mfg. Co.,
246 App. Div. 678, 284 N. Y. Supp. 104 (4th Dept. 1935).
'N. Y. CIV. PRAc. AcT § 48, (2).
'Dickenson v. Mayor, 92 N. Y. 584 (1883) ; MfcFarlane v. City of Niagara
Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 160 N. E. 391 (1928); Payne v. New York, S. & W.
R. R. Co., 201 N. Y. 436, 95 N. E. 19 (1911) ; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th
ed. 1929) § § 347, 349, quoted with approval in Hal v. Sugo, 169 N. Y. 109,
62 N. E. 135 (1901) ; Sheppard v. Green, 48 S. C. 165, 26 S. E. 224 (1897) ;
Smith v. Smith, 50 S. C. 54, 27 S. E. 545 (1897) ; Broughel v. Southern N. E.
Tel. Co., 72 Conn. 617, 45 At. 435 (1900).
7 Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 235, 177 N. E. 431 (1931); Conklin
v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227 (1st Dept. 1930), affd, 254 N. Y. 620, 173 N. E.
892 (1930); Wiener v. Ellrodt, 268 N. Y. 646. 198 N. E. 537 (1935); Cappuci
v. Barone, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N. E. 653 (1919).
11 bid.
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But the defendant has also breached a statutory duty which may
have two different results: (A) If the statute was enacted for the
benefit of a particular class of persons, a breach of it is deemed neg-
ligence per se,9 the effect of which is to create a cause of action for
a member of a class injured by such breach; 10 this cause of action
based on statute, is separate and distinct from the tort action of neg-
ligence; 11 (B) if the statute is a general police regulation, rather than
for the benefit of a particular class of persons, and is punishable solely
as a public offence, proof of its breach would act merely as a specifi-
cation of negligence.12
As to which result the breach of a statute leads, depends upon
the language and intent of the statute.1 3 Actions brought under the
Workmen's Compensation Law were held to be actions created by
statute and therefore governed by the six-year period of limitation.' 4
In a suit under the Workmen's Compensation Law the defenses of
assumption of risk and the negligence of fellow-servants were taken
away from the employer; 15 in addition new duties were imposed such
as requiring the maintenance of specified safeguards, the total effect of
which was the creation of a liability on the employer where heretofore
there was none and thereby a cause of action was created.' 6
By a similar analysis it can be said that the Legislature has thus
created a cause of action for a breach of Section 229 of the Labor Law.
There is now a liability on the employer where previously none ex-
isted, for the employer may not use any device which would be suffi-
cient under the common4aw duty of care owed to the servant, but it
'lRacine v. Morris, 201 N. Y. 240, 94 N. E. 864 (1911) ; Watkins v. Naval
Colliery Corp., L. R. App. Cas. 693 (1912); 27 Halsbury's Laws of England
192.
, Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 482 (1916);
Ward v. Erie Ry. Co., 230 N. Y. 230, 232, 139 N. E. 886 (1921); DeMilt v.
Hart, 235 N. Y. 464, 139 N. E. 575 (1923); Ross v. D. L. & W. R. R., 231
N. Y. 335, 132 N. E. 108 (1921); Kelly v. N. Y. State Rys., 207 N. Y. 342,
100 N. E. 1115 (1913).
n Martin v. Herzog, 228 N. Y. 164, 126 N. E. 814 (1920); DeCaprio v.
N. Y. Cen., 231 N. Y. 94, 131 N. E. 746 (1921); Kelly v. N. Y. State Rys.,
207 N. Y. 342, 100 N. E. 1115 (1913) ; Abounader v. Strohmeyer, 217 App. Div.
43, 215 N. Y. Supp. 702 (4th Dept. 1926).
'Kelly v. N. Y. State Rys., 207 N. Y. 342, 100 N. E. 1115 (1913) ; Union
Pac. Ry. Co. v. McDonold, 152 U. S. 262, 283, 14 Sup. Ct. 619 (1893) ; Hays
v. Michigan Cen. Ry. Co., 111 U. S. 228, 239, 4 Sup. Ct. 369 (1853) ; Fluker v.
Ziegele Brewing Co., 201 N. Y. 40, 93\N. E. 1112 (1911).
'Taylor v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co., 45 Mich. 74, 7 N. W. 728 (1881).
14 Jeffrey v. Miller, Inc., 222 N. Y. 135, 118 N. E. 522 (1917) ; Detniar v.
Nussbaunh, 149 Misc. 469, 267 N. Y. Supp. 732 (1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div.
720, 269 N. Y. Supp. 1006 (1st Dept. 1934).
Caddy v. Interborough R. T. Co., 195 N. Y. 415, 88 N. E. 747 (1909);
Pinsdorf v. Kellogg & Co., 108 App. Div. 209, 95 N. Y. Supp. 617 (1st Dept.
1905) ; Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., 266 N. Y. 139, 194 N. E. 61 (1934);
Gmaele v. Rosenberg, 178 N. Y. 147, 70 N. E. 411 (1904).
" Shepard v. Taylor Pub. Co., 234 N. Y. 465, 138 N. E. 409 (1923).
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is mandatory that he use a specific device of adequate capacity.17 It
also does away with the two defenses formerly mentioned as available
to the employer under common law, which in themselves would have
barred a recovery if the employer could have used them.' 8
General police regulations insofar as they do not benefit a par-
ticular class of persons do not create new liabilities toward persons
injured by their breach, and therefore do not give a cause of action.'9
The breach of Section 229 of the Labor Law gives a cause of action
separate and distinct from that of negligence. The six-year period of
limitation applies. 20
L.J.
"Arnold v. National Starch Co., 194 N. Y. 42, 86 N. E. 815 (1909);
Willy v. Mulledy, 18 N. Y. 310 (1879).
18 Bohlen, The Connon Law Right of Action for Occupational Diseases in
Pennsylvania (1915) 63 U. OF PA. L. REv. 183; Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co.,
266 N. Y. 139, 194 N. E. 61 (1934).
" Koerster v. Rochester Candy Works, 194 N. Y. 92, 87 N. E. 77 (1909);
Fluker v. Ziegele Brewing Co., 201 N. Y. 40, 93 N. E. 1112 (1911).
'Gropp v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 205 N. Y. 617, 98 N. E. 1103 (1912).
1937)]
